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2 Understanding the question
Philosophy and its history
Tim Crane
1 Introduction
What is the relevance of the history of philosophy to philosophy as such? This is
not the question, what is the reason for studying the history of philosophy? This
question is easy to answer. Philosophy is part of our culture, and the history of
our culture is worth studying, if anything is. Nor is it the question, should aca-
demic institutions teach the history of philosophy as part of a philosophical edu-
cation? It is widely accepted that students should be taught the history of
philosophy, even if philosophy itself is not considered an essentially historical dis-
cipline. An education in the history of philosophy is part of a broadly humanistic
university education, and something of value for this reason alone, without
it being necessary for anyone who actually pursues philosophy creatively and
systematically to have to take history into account.
The question is rather what relevance the history of philosophy has for philo-
sophy, considered as a creative, systematic discipline? Why should philosophers
engaged in the pursuit of philosophical questions take any notice of the history of
the subject? The question has, of course, been asked many times. One common
answer is that history is relevant today because it enables philosophers to avoid
the errors of the past: this is an application to philosophy of Santayana’s famous
claim that those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it. This
‘prophylactic’ answer has some value, but it is hard to believe it is the whole
story. After all, there are so many errors to avoid, and it would be an industrious
philosopher who felt the need to pursue the sources of all of them in the writers of
the past. More to the point, there is no reason why they should.
Another answer is that we should study the great philosophers simply because
they are better than we are. Their longevity is some evidence of their greatness,
and their texts are worth mining for insights which lesser minds of today might
miss. These insights might be truths which the works of the great philosophers
contain, or neglected ways of looking at things, or some other kind of illumina-
tion. Although there is surely something right about this, the approach fails to
explain why we think views which we cannot possibly believe are relevant to
genuine philosophical inquiry. I don’t think we continue to read Leibniz, Spinoza
and Berkeley only because we have not yet ruled out the possibility that their texts
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might contain some nugget of truth. The ‘nugget’ approach, like the ‘prophylactic’
approach, does not give an adequate answer to our question.
The answer I will give here is somewhat diﬀerent. I will argue that unless we
have some genuine historical awareness of the origin and source of the problems
we are addressing, we cannot claim that we really know what these problems are.
I will argue this by arguing for the following claims:
(1) A philosophical tradition is constituted by a historically constituted collection
of canonical texts, together with a certain way of reading these texts;
(2) It is only by locating the questions philosophers ask in relation to a philosophical
tradition that we can make real sense of these questions.
It follows from these two claims that we can only make real sense of the questions
philosophers ask by locating them in relation to a historically constituted collec-
tion of canonical texts. How exactly one does this—what ‘locating’ and ‘making
real sense’ really mean—is a complex matter that does not have one simple
answer. Here I will suggest an answer that does not rely on one particular philo-
sophical method and applies to diﬀerent philosophical traditions. My answer will
also help us in the attempt to understand the diﬀerence between ‘analytic’ and
‘continental’ philosophy.
I realize that claims (1) and (2) will strike some philosophers as obvious or tri-
vial. But they will also strike some as deeply misguided. My aim here is to per-
suade both these groups of philosophers that they are wrong, and that in
recognizing this we may go some way to realizing what is wrong with some of the
usual ways of thinking of the relationship between philosophy and its history.
2 Tradition: texts and interpretation
My ﬁrst claim is about the nature of traditions in philosophy: traditions are his-
torically constituted collections of canonical texts, together with a certain way of
reading them. While many will take this as obvious, I suspect that some analytic
philosophers will dispute it, for the reason that the analytic tradition is essentially
constituted not by its texts, but by a particular style, or a method, or a speciﬁc col-
lection of problems, or a collection of doctrines. Style, method, problems and
doctrines are important for characterizing philosophers, of course; but I claim
that they only constitute the elements of a tradition in the context of a set of
canonical texts. This is not the kind of claim that could be proved by some kind
of deductive argument. I will rather defend it in two diﬀerent ways: by looking at
some features of the traditions themselves; and by disputing some other ways of
looking at traditions.
First, let me begin with some obvious facts about the ‘analytic’ tradition in
philosophy. There is no agreed-upon deﬁnition of analytic philosophy; but this
does not mean that there is no such thing. Analytic philosophy is an almost
entirely academic enterprise, in the sense that it takes place largely in universities.
Like other academic disciplines, it has a sense of itself as a profession, with its own
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norms and standards, training and career advancement. When analytic philoso-
phers say that someone is ‘not really a philosopher’, they do not mean that the
person in question is not interested in the big questions of time, existence or
morality (say). They normally mean that the person has not had this kind of
philosophical training, and does not address these questions in the way that
trained analytic philosophers do.
Analytic philosophy is without question the dominant contemporary tradition
in academic philosophy in the universities of the USA, the UK and Australasia;
and it also has a strong representation in continental Europe, notably in Scandinavia
and Germany. Those who are part of this tradition tend to reject contributions
from other traditions either by dismissing them as not really philosophy, or even
as fraud or bullshit; or more defensively, as part of another tradition of which
they are, regrettably or not, ignorant.
But what makes this tradition the tradition it is? The answer stares out from
the opening pages of books about analytic philosophy: there we are told that
analytic philosophy had its origin either in the logical and mathematical works of
Frege, or in the rebellion against the British Hegelians by Russell and Moore, or
in some combination of these two philosophical moments. These views about its
historical origins then form the basis of the selection canonical texts of the tradi-
tion: Über Sinn und Bedeutung, the Grundlagen, ‘On Denoting’, The Problems of Philo-
sophy, Principia Ethica, the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations, ‘Two Dogmas of
Empiricism’, A Theory of Justice, Naming and Necessity and so on—these are the kinds
of texts one has to have read if one is to speak authoritatively within the tradition
as a whole. However, there are of course slightly diﬀerent canons for diﬀerent
schools within the tradition—in some places, the writings of Wilfrid Sellars might
be canonical; in others, Rudolf Carnap, or J. L. Austin, and so on.
Are there texts which are members of any canon within the analytic tradition?
There no doubt are, and it is an (interesting) empirical question which texts these
are; but not one I will address here. What I do want to emphasize, however, is
that the occurrence of a text in an analytic canon is not suﬃcient to make that
text a work of analytic philosophy in itself. Work by uncontroversially ‘continental’
philosophers has been studied and made use of by analytic philosophers: texts by
Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger are obvious
examples. Going further back, Kant is seen as an originator of analytic and con-
tinental traditions, and he is probably the most obvious example of a thinker
whose texts are treated as canonical by both traditions. Traditions are deﬁned by
their canonical texts, but texts can belong to more than one tradition.
What this shows is that we need to mention more than just a list of texts if we
want to characterize a tradition. We also need to mention the way of reading
those texts. This is partly a matter of how we approach the text critically: do we
try and ﬁnd out what arguments or reasons philosophers give for their views
within the texts in question? Or do we relate their concerns back to the philoso-
phers they were reacting to? Or do we look at their social and political context in
order to understand why they put forward the views they did? One thing that is
central to these endeavours is trying to ﬁnd out what question it is that they are
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addressing, or that their work can be used to address. To do this, we need not
assume that the philosophers themselves saw this question as central; and it would
not necessarily invalidate this reading of the philosopher if it were shown that this
question were not central to their work.
So for example, Michael Dummett is well-known for his interpretation of
Frege, and this interpretation has had a signiﬁcant impact on Frege’s place in the
canon. Dummett’s ﬁrst book was called Frege: Philosophy of Language, and one of its
themes was that Frege put philosophy of language at the centre of his philosophy.
Dummett argues that according to Frege, an account of thought can only be
given through an account of language. This had the eﬀect of making some of
Frege’s writings more canonical than others: ‘Der Gedanke’ and ‘Über Sinn und
Bedeutung’ are central to the canon, whereas some of Frege’s more mathematical
writings are not. This is because the question at issue is the one Dummett has
posed on Frege’s behalf—how does thought connect to reality? Dummett’s
answer is that Frege thinks that thought connects to reality through language
connecting to reality, hence the centrality of the theory of sense and reference.
Critics of Dummett have objected to his imposing this vision of things onto
Frege (see, e.g., Sluga 1980; Weiner 1999). According to some of these critics,
Frege was not primarily a philosopher of language at all. His primary concern
was with the foundations of mathematics and our knowledge of mathematics.
However, it is important to realize that even if this is correct, it does not invali-
date Dummett’s question. Dummett sees the question for philosophy as being one
about ‘giving an account of thought’. No one should deny that this is a legitimate
question, even if they think other questions are more important or more central
to the work of certain thinkers. Dummett treats Frege as his precursor in this
enterprise, and even if he is wrong about Frege’s actual concerns, the fact that he
treats Frege as such, and that this has helped to sustain Frege’s writings as part of
the canon is itself a signiﬁcant fact about the analytic canon. So it is possible
simultaneously to see Dummett as wrong about what Frege’s actual concerns
were, and yet right that his writings can be read in a way in which they are seen
to be addressing the concerns of late twentieth-century philosophy.
In eﬀect, Dummett ‘co-opts’ Frege, so to speak, as sharing a concern he has, as
attempting to answer a question which he wants answered. In a similar way, ana-
lytic philosophers can co-opt philosophers whose works are canonical in diﬀerent
traditions, to help understand and answer the questions that are their central concerns.
So, for example, Hubert Dreyfus has used ideas from Heidegger’s early work as part
of his attempt to draw a picture of the mind as essentially involving an active,
embodied worldliness, as part of a critique of what are sometimes called ‘Cartesian’
preoccupations in epistemology and philosophy of mind. It is fairly uncontroversial,
I think, to all except a few diehard ‘Dreyfusards’, that this is a selective misrepresenta-
tion of Heidegger’s philosophical project. But once again, it is intelligible to hold that
Dreyfus has Heidegger wrong, but also that he has made a case that Heidegger’s
ideas can be incorporated into the answer to the question which he himself is asking.
The relationship between traditions and canonical texts is therefore a complex
one, mediated by a concern with questions that both derive from a philosophical
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tradition and are also read back into that tradition. The view being defended
here is not that there is a set menu of questions, and that philosophers mis-
interpret the views of past philosophers so as to use their work to answer these
questions. This would be to suggest that the menu of the central, or important, or
legitimate philosophical questions is already ﬁxed in some way, and using the
works of past philosophers is just one way to go about answering them.
The truth is rather that there is no set menu of questions. The questions evolve
over time, and they arise partly because of the way we read the philosophers of
the past. Which philosophers we read depends on the canonical texts of the tra-
dition, but the way in which we read them depends also on the dominant con-
cerns of the tradition. Some dominant concerns of analytic philosophy have been:
a concern with realism, with accommodating the knowledge gained by science
into a coherent philosophy, with logic and its relationship to human thought, with
systematic (as opposed to ‘critical’) theorizing about language, mind, value and
reality, and so on. It is because of these concerns that analytic philosophers have
pursued the ideas of thinkers of the past; but their understanding of those concerns
shapes, and is shaped by, the readings of those thinkers. So, just as Dummett’s
understanding of the problems of the philosophy of language shapes his reading of
Frege as a philosopher—as the philosopher who put questions about language at
the heart of philosophy—so his reading of Frege shapes his understanding of the
problem space (e.g., that the notion of reference must play a role in the theory of
meaning; sense is something ‘objective’ and mind-independent—etc.). Similarly,
just as the contemporary understanding of the problem of scepticism shapes our
understanding of Kant’s project—the refutation of scepticism, and the response to
the challenge posed by Hume—so Kant’s own ideas shape our understanding of
the available problem space (empirical vs transcendental idealism, etc.).
A philosophical tradition, then, is a collection of canonical texts together with a
way of reading those texts in the light of the central questions of the tradition.
The central questions of the tradition both arise from the canonical texts and also
aﬀect (or infect) the readings of those texts.
Analytic philosophy, I claim, is a tradition in this sense. In late twentieth- and
early twenty-ﬁrst-century philosophical discourse, analytic philosophy is often
contrasted with continental philosophy. Continental philosophy is a tradition (or
collection of traditions) in this sense too. Of course, continental philosophy cannot
be characterized in the same way as analytic philosophy, partly because many
(indeed, most) of the leading continental philosophers did not (or do not) describe
themselves as such. This is one of the many reasons why the term ‘continental’ is
so unsatisfactory. It goes without saying that Nietzsche and Heidegger did not
think of themselves as ‘continental’ philosophers, of course; but the same is true of
many leading contemporary ﬁgures in French philosophy like Alain Badiou or
Jacques Ranciere. In a similar way to analytic philosophers, these ﬁgures sometimes
represent what they do simply as ‘philosophy’, without any explicit acknowledgement
that others do it in a diﬀerent way.
However, even if the term is unsatisfactory, and few continental philosophers
self-identify as such, it is undeniable that there is such a thing, and it is just as
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recognizable as analytic philosophy. Continental philosophy draws its undisputed
canonical texts from the works of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Bergson, Husserl
and Heidegger and others—in the sense that anyone educating themselves within
this tradition would be expected to gain knowledge of the central texts of these
authors at least. Continental philosophy is no more one single thing than analytic
philosophy is; there are Marxist, psychoanalytic and phenomenological traditions
within the overall tradition labelled ‘continental’. But the reality of the tradition
justiﬁes one label, however vague it might be around the edges.
Among the many kinds of thing picked out with this label, we should distin-
guish two things. First, there is the group of thinkers, mostly nineteenth- and
twentieth-century German philosophers, who would ﬁgure in any history of con-
tinental philosophy since Kant (see Leiter and Rosen 2010). And second, there is
continental philosophy as it is currently practised by those in recognizably ‘con-
tinental’ institutions, whether or not these are departments of philosophy, or lit-
erature or some other discipline. Some commentators have argued that the label
‘continental’ can be as sensibly applied to thinkers in the ﬁrst group (e.g., Hegel,
Nietzsche) as to those in the second, and that thinkers in the ﬁrst group can be
studied using the methods and style of analytic philosophy. They conclude that
there is therefore no real philosophical distinction between continental philosophy
and the rest of philosophy, and that those who claim otherwise are misleadingly
appropriating thinkers from the ﬁrst group in order to serve their academic political
purposes, or to isolate themselves from philosophical criticism.
However, when I talk here about continental philosophy, I mean philosophy of
the second kind. Many nineteenth- and twentieth-century German thinkers have
been discussed in the analytic tradition—Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, etc.—
and this does not eliminate the distinction between analytic and continental phi-
losophy as it is institutionally realized. Indeed, the explanation I have just given of
the nature of traditions would explain why this is so: thinkers can be co-opted by
a current tradition when writers within that tradition consider that these thinkers
have some way of posing or answering the questions within it, or of showing what
is wrong with the current questions or their answers. So it is with Bernard Williams’s
use of Nietzsche, for example, or Robert Brandom’s use of Hegel.
Continental philosophy as it is currently practised has post-war French philo-
sophy at its heart. Continental thinkers do discuss Nietzsche and Heidegger, of
course, but the conversation has been going on for some time, and is typically
developed through the readings of more recent twentieth-century thinkers. Unless
you are yourself already a canonical ﬁgure, you will not get very far in a con-
tinental philosophy journal if you simply attempt to interpret Nietzsche in your
own terms, as opposed to taking into account the readings of Nietzsche which
various continental philosophers have oﬀered. (Mutatis mutandis the same is true, of
course, of analytic philosophy: you are unlikely to get very far by proposing a
wholly new reading of Frege which takes no account of the way his ideas have
been read by the thinkers of the analytic tradition.)
Post-war French philosophy has been dominated by three themes, as Alain
Badiou points out in his recent book, The Adventure of French Philosophy (2012). One
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is political engagement, by which he (in eﬀect) means engagement with Marxist
thought of various kinds, often contextualized by reﬂection on the events in Paris
of 1968. The second is psychoanalysis, which is normally approached via readings
of Lacan, and his followers. The third is literature, with which a number twentieth-
century French philosophers have been involved, Sartre being an obvious example
(but Badiou himself is a novelist too). If you wanted something which constitutes
the essence of continental philosophy you would not go far wrong by starting with
these three themes. But the themes alone are not enough: the canonical texts are
needed to give a structure to the discussion of the themes.
So far I have tried to draw a general picture of some traditions in philosophy
and how they develop, in broad outlines. It is worth making explicit that my aim
here is not to endorse or justify the classiﬁcation of works as analytic or con-
tinental. I am not saying that this is a good or bad way to divide up areas of
philosophy; I am only saying that it is, as a matter of fact, the way people do
divide these things up, for good or ill, and so I am giving a descriptive, external
account of how they come to be divided in this way.
There are, of course, alternative accounts of what characterizes and divides the
traditions. It is common for analytic philosophers to recognize that their traditions
have historical origins, which help to deﬁne the tradition. But they tend to resist
the idea that the story of these origins is what characterizes analytic philosophy as
a whole. They prefer to say that the origins are one thing, and the methods or tech-
niques of analytic philosophy are something diﬀerent. I want to reject this approach.
I don’t think that there is any way to specify the method or style of analytic philo-
sophy independently of the paradigms of the philosophical texts which form its
canon. I have discussed elsewhere how neither an appeal to ‘logic’ nor an appeal
to ‘science’ can give a distinctive method or style to analytic philosophy (Crane
2011). I would now like to make a few remarks about the idea of argument.
It is undoubtedly true that analytic philosophy places great importance on
argument, and its texts are full of arguments. But the history of philosophy from
Plato to Kant is full of arguments too, and many of these arguments are recog-
nizably the same kind of thing as you ﬁnd in the twentieth-century analytic tra-
dition. Some respond to this triumphantly by claiming that this just shows that all
good philosophy in the past was analytic really, or at least that the analytic ideal
was alive and well before the late nineteenth century. This is misleading, to say
the least, since it hard to combine with the historical claim (which few deny) that
analytic philosophy was invented in Cambridge by Russell and Moore. This claim
is not that Russell and Moore were simply rediscovering the methods of argument
that were used by Descartes and Kant, which had somehow been lost in the era
of Bradley, Green and McTaggart. On the contrary: there are plenty of arguments
in Bradley and McTaggart. On the usual historical conception of the origins of
analytical philosophy, Russell and Moore were not rediscovering anything: they
had invented something new.
What then is the role of argument in analytic philosophy? An ‘argument’ can
be a series of premises leading deductively to a conclusion; more broadly, it can
be the presentation of the reasons for believing something without any claim to
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deductive validity; or more broadly still, it can be the description of a philoso-
phical vision, for example, the invitation to approach a question in a new way. It
seems to me that some of the most famous arguments in the history of analytic
philosophy—for example, Quine’s argument in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’
against the analytic–synthetic distinction—are really of this last form. Presented in
terms of its premises and its conclusion, Quine’s argument is hardly convincing:
why should a defender of the notion of analyticity be concerned with the fact that
the notion cannot be explained independently of notions such as sameness of
meaning? But when understood as an attempt to persuade the reader to look at
the question of meaning in a new way, to stop thinking in terms of a sharp dis-
tinction between truths of meaning and truths of fact, the argument is much more
eﬀective. In fact, I doubt whether many of those who were persuaded of Quine’s
conclusion were persuaded by the arguments about synonymy, etc.; much more
eﬀective, surely, was the alternative vision he created.
Arguments of this broader kind are common in analytic philosophy, and it
would distort the phenomena to insist that the only parts of the tradition which
properly deserve the name ‘analytic’ are those arguments that are put in terms of
a conclusion derived deductively from premises. It would be even more fanciful to
insist that everything that counts as a piece of analytic philosophy can be recon-
structed in these terms. Once we recognize the variety of things that count as
arguments in analytic philosophy, we can free ourselves from the idea that
deductive validity is the only ideal to which the tradition aspires. In doing this, we
should then accept that argument in this sense is neither necessary nor suﬃcient
for a piece of philosophy to belong to the analytic tradition.
My ﬁrst claim, then, is that a tradition is constituted by a collection of canoni-
cal texts, together with a way of reading those texts. A text may belong to more
than one tradition, and the reading of the text within a particular tradition will be
prompted by the prior questions of the tradition, which themselves have a history
within the tradition. I cannot claim to have proved or established that this is the
essence of a philosophical tradition; but in my view no alternative conception of
traditions is adequate.
3 Making sense of philosophical questions
The second premise in my main argument is that it is only in the context of
a philosophical tradition that we can make real sense of the questions that
philosophers ask.
Philosophical problems can be understood in more or less detail, of course; and
I don’t mean that no one can understand anything about a problem by looking at
it outside the context of its historical development. And nor do I mean that one
needs to understand the extraphilosophical circumstances that led to the con-
struction of the great works of the past in order to grasp their content. My
emphasis is rather on the idea of a philosophical tradition, as characterized above.
The point I want to make is that the questions we ask can be best understood in
the context of the texts which prompted them.
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I will illustrate this with a problem which has been at the focus of some of my
own philosophical work: the mind–body problem. This problem is typically
introduced by asking whether mind and body (or mental states and physical
states) are distinct. It is then normal to list the standard answers to this question:
they are distinct (dualism) or they are not (materialism or physicalism, with ide-
alism sometimes oﬀered as a wacky alternative). Varieties of dualism—property vs
substance—are introduced and so are varieties of physicalism: reductive vs non-
reductive. The debate then continues as to which of these options is correct,
employing arguments about consciousness, mental causation, variable realization,
zombies, the possibility of disembodied existence and so on.
But why would one ask whether mind and body were distinct in the ﬁrst place?
Why does this question arise? Is it the sort of question that would occur to any
reﬂective person if they were to contemplate aspects of our existence? Maybe; but
the absence of this particular way of thinking in some other philosophical tradi-
tions should make us pause. Of course, speculations about our mental capacities
and our consciousness can arise in many ways. In contemporary intellectual cul-
ture, the discussion often starts with the idea that there must be some neural
explanation for everything, or that there can’t be such an explanation; but this is
a diﬀerent question from whether mind and body are distinct.
It’s important to recognize here that the analytic discussion of the mind–body
problem does not simply allow for just any kind of speculation about the mind and
its embodiment. Speculations have to be ﬁtted, on the whole, into the template
provided by the various forms of materialism and dualism (sometimes with idealism
added). This is not meant as a criticism of the standard debate; the debate pro-
vides a structure within which philosophers can precisify and reﬁne their positions
without having to start ab initio in every discussion. But nonetheless the debate is
constrained; my suggestion is that the debate is constrained by its history, and that
an examination of the history shows you what kind of question the mind–body
question really is.
Love it or hate it, the classic historical text in the philosophy of mind is Descartes’s
Meditations. There was, of course, philosophy of mind before Descartes, but Des-
cartes’s work is the place where the modern conception of the mind was articu-
lated. This is a conception which made ‘thought’ in a very broad sense the mark
of the mental, and relegated the functions of the soul as identiﬁed by Aristotle
into merely mechanical activities. One of Descartes’s aims in this book is to
establish what he called the ‘real distinction’ between mind and body, and he
provided a number of famous arguments for this distinction. The upshot of his dis-
cussion is his dualism, and his opponents propose the various forms of materialism in
response.
Things could have gone diﬀerently. The threefold Aristotelian idea of the
soul—the vegetative, sensitive and rational souls—might not have been aban-
doned as it was in the seventeenth century, and instead of discussing the real
distinction between mind and body, we might have been discussing the relation-
ship between the various faculties of the soul. Those who see Descartes’s inﬂuence
in framing the debate as largely negative may consider this a preferable
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alternative. Here I am not discussing whether our predicament is in some ways
undesirable, however; I am just describing the predicament itself.
My claim is illustrated, I think, by the fact that it is typical even for the least
historically minded philosophers to introduce their view of the metaphysics of
mind in relation to Descartes, Berkeley or Leibniz, say; or in relation to more
recent writers such as Lewis and Armstrong. There is not usually an extensive
scholarly discussion of these texts, but there is nonetheless a point to introducing
thinkers like this: it places a marker as to what the terms of the debate are, and the
context in which the acceptable positions arise. The positions arise because of the
debate that we have inherited. Positions are not simply picked out of the thinkers’
minds, as if they were things that any self-conscious and reﬂective philosopher
would come up with in a free afternoon. The available positions are presented as
they are because they seem the only available ones possible given the framework
of the problem as it has been introduced in the philosophical discussions over
the decades. In other words, positions arise as they do in relation to the canonical
texts.
It is possible for thinkers to attempt to break the mould even when working
within a particular tradition. Wittgenstein was preoccupied with breaking out of
the mindset or picture that led to what he saw as the apparently inevitable yet
spurious choice between materialism, dualism and behaviourism. Some of his
followers have attempted to pursue this agenda, without conspicuous success.
More conservatively, Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism (1970) was recog-
nized as a genuinely new option in the metaphysics of mind, and was soon added
to the list of alternative positions (how long it will stay on that list remains to be
seen at the time of writing). Others, like John Searle (1992), have attempted to
reject the entire framework of materialism and dualism. Searle argues that even
thinking in terms of materialism versus dualism presents us with unacceptable
choices: the mental-as-opposed-to-the-physical versus the-physical-as-opposed-to-
the-mental. The fact that Searle’s alternative way of thinking did not shift the debate
may have as much to do with the ingrained ways of thinking of the tradition as it
does with any inadequacies of Searle’s own presentation of his views.
My claim, then, is that the range of positions available in response to a ques-
tion is established by the tradition, where a tradition is understood as a collection
of canonical texts and a way of reading those texts, as outlined above. My ﬁnal
point is to link this claim to the idea of understanding a philosophical question.
To understand a question is not just to understand its constituent words, but in
many cases it also involves knowing what kind of thing would count as an
acceptable answer to it. Someone who walks into the kitchen and says ‘where’s
the milk?’ would be expecting an answer of a certain kind: in the fridge, on the table,
in the cupboard … Some answers would be more surprising but possible (in the
washing machine, on the ﬂoor) but others would be sensible answers only in jest
(still in the cow). If you ask who a certain person is at a social event, you expect to
be told their name, or a description of them, or their title, or be given an
admission of ignorance. Asking a question is a request for information, and often
the conversational context narrows down the kind of information one is after.
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One may also answer a question by attempting to subvert it: by showing that it
rests on some false presupposition, or that some of the concepts in terms of which
it is expressed are confused. When Bob Dylan was asked by a journalist how
many protest singers there were, he replied ‘either 136 or 142’. Questions can be
subverted or undermined by mockery, humour or an explanation of the incoherence
of the concepts being used.
All of these things happen with philosophical questions too. When David
Bourget and David Chalmers published their recent survey of academic philoso-
phers’ opinions, they asked questions in the form ‘A Priori Knowledge: Accept or
Lean Towards, Yes or No’ with the option of answering by ticking ‘other’
(Bourget and Chalmers 2014). In 20 of the 30 questions, the largest percentage of
participants opted either for the yes or no answers, indicating some consensus
about the acceptable range of answers to these questions. But interestingly, for 10
questions, ‘other’ got the largest percentage. What this exactly means will depend
on the question under discussion. But it is highly likely that philosophers in these
cases will be unhappy with the way in which the question is posed; they think it is
not a straightforward yes/no question, and maybe they will want to dismantle or
undermine the presuppositions of the question. The lesson I draw from this is not
just that analytic philosophers do not regard all their questions as yes/no questions,
but that often the meaning of the question itself is something that is contestable.
How should these observations about traditions help us in our actual attempts to
answer philosophical questions? How should knowledge of history aﬀect the practice
of systematic philosophy? Although I’m sceptical of the value and eﬀectiveness of
telling people how to philosophize, I would like to draw three tentative morals.
The ﬁrst is that some awareness the history of a question can help us to
understand better what the question really is, and what admissible answers to the
questions might be for us today. To take the example of the mind–body problem,
a clear understanding of what Descartes meant by ‘substance’ will help us
understand what ‘substance dualism’ really is, whether it is a credible category for
contemporary philosophy, whether we should be thinking in terms of substance at
all, and if so, what this means for the formulation of the doctrine of materialism/
physicalism.
The second moral is that an awareness of the history of the question one is
pursuing can make one sensitive to the contingency of the question, in the sense of
the contingency of the philosophical concerns that give rise to it. For example, the
formulation of the doctrine of materialism/physicalism in analytic philosophy took
a very speciﬁc form in the twentieth century—in terms of all truths being expressed
in physical language—because of very speciﬁc ideas deriving from logical positivism
about what philosophy can and cannot do. Reﬂection on these ideas and their
eﬀects can help us see that they are detachable from the core of doctrines like
materialism; and dispensing with these assumptions can help us to see the questions
in a new light. In some cases, it may help us to move away from the questions
altogether, and to pose new questions which make more sense to us today.
My third moral relates to the communication of philosophical ideas. Some-
times those who come across philosophical texts for the ﬁrst time do not just ﬁnd
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it hard to answer the questions contained in them; they ﬁnd it hard to know what
an answer would even look like. When faced with a question like ‘what is time?’
or ‘what is substance?’ or ‘what is the mind?’, the reaction can be baﬄement
rather than mere ignorance. Here some historical awareness can help us in
removing this sense of incomprehensibility. Rather than just asserting that
McTaggart, for example, thought that time was unreal—why would anyone think
that?—and asking whether he is right or wrong, we can attempt to give some idea
of what it meant for philosophers of this kind to deny the reality of something, to
draw out the long tradition of distinguishing between appearance and reality, and
how McTaggart’s views ﬁt into that tradition.
The emphasis on the historical origins of our questions is not supposed to show
that these questions are pointless or unanswerable; it is not a general-purpose
debunking method for the dissolution of philosophy. And nor is it supposed to
replace the systematic investigation of questions with a ‘merely’ historical investi-
gation. Rather, it is meant to enhance our understanding both of the questions
themselves and the available answers to them, by demonstrating the complex and
contingent nature of their origins.
4 Conclusion
G. E. Moore once said that he would not have thought about philosophical problems
if it had not been for what other philosophers have said:
I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me
any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me
is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences.
(Moore 1942: 14)
This is sometimes taken as a sign of Moore’s superﬁciality—surely, the line of
thought goes, philosophical problems just come to philosophers who are the
real thing, the genuine article? They just think philosophically and don’t need the
stimulation of other writers.
Whatever may be true of the motivations of some individual philosophers, it
seems to me that when we broaden our view and try and say something about an
entire tradition, what Moore says is deeply true. Philosophical questions arise out
of philosophical speculation, puzzlement and confusion. But they do this always
in the context of what other philosophers have said, and in the context of parti-
cular ways of interpreting what they said. My hope is that when this obvious fact
is properly absorbed into our practice as philosophers, we will gain a richer
understanding of the complex structure of philosophical questions and with it, a
more realistic understanding of how we might answer them.1
1 Thanks to Katalin Farkas and Sacha Golob for discussion of these questions, and to those attending
the Philosophical Insights conference at the Institute of Philosophy in London in 2012 for their
comments, and to Eugen Fischer and John Collins for organizing this excellent conference.
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